
Abstract
We study a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation
in which ex ante identical groups may be treated asymmetrically in equilibrium. The
interaction between an informational externality and general equilibrium effects creates
incentives for groups to specialize, and discrimination may arise even if the corresponding
model with a single group has a unique equilibrium. The dominant group gains from discrimination,
rationalizing why a majority may be reluctant to eliminate discrimination. The model
is also consistent with "reverse discrimination'' as a remedy against discrimination
since it may be necessary to decrease the welfare of the dominant group to achieve
parity.

CitationBibTeX
Andrea Moro, and Peter Norman. "A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination,"
Journal of Economic Theory 114(1),
pp. 130, January
2004
@article{moronormangeneralequilibriumstatisticaldiscrimination2004,
title = "A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination",
author = "Andrea Moro and Peter Norman",
year = "2004",
month = " January",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
number = "1",
volume = "114",
pages = "130",
url = "https://andreamoro.net/assets/papers/a_general_equilibrium_model_of_statistical_discrimination.pdf"
}