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Abstract
This paper investigates how lack of information may bias the investigator's
assessment of the presence of statistical discrimination. We show that the nature of
the bias is such that statistical discrimination may be rejected in a Mincerian regression
even when the data is generated from an equilibrium with statistical discrimination.
This may occur even when the investigator has a more informative signal of productivity
the employers have.
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CitationBibTeX
Moro, Andrea, and Peter Norman. "Empirical Implications of Statistical Discrimination on the Returns to Measures of Skill,"
Annals of Economics and Statistics 71-72,
pp. 399-417,
2003
@article{moro-norman-empirical-implications-statistical-discrimination-2003,
title = "Empirical Implications of Statistical Discrimination on the Returns to Measures of Skill",
author = "Moro, Andrea and Peter Norman",
year = "2003",
journal = "Annals of Economics and Statistics",
volume = "71-72",
pages = "399-417",
url = "https://andreamoro.net/assets/papers/empirical_implications_of_statistical_discrimination.pdf"
}