Andrea Moro's webpage

Curriculum Vitae

Published research

• Do Female Executives Make a Difference? The Impact of Female Leadership on Gender Gaps and Firm Performance
  • The Economic Journal Vol. 129(622), August 2019, 2390–2423 (with Luca Flabbi, Mario Macis and Fabiano Schivardi).
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    We investigate the effects of female executives on gender-specific wage distributions and firm performance. We find that female leadership has a positive impact at the top of the female wage distribution and a negative impact at the bottom. Moreover, the impact of female leadership on firm performance increases with the share of female workers. Our empirical strategy accounts for the endogeneity induced by the non-random assignment of executives to firms by including in the regressions firm fixed effects, by generating controls from a two-way fixed effects regression, and by building instruments based on regional trends. The empirical findings are consistent with a model of statistical dis- crimination where female executives are better equipped at interpreting signals of productivity from female workers. The evidence suggests substantial costs of under-representation of women at the top of the corporate hierarchy.
  • External appendix
  • Citation BibTeX
    Flabbi, Luca, Mario Macis, Andrea Moro, and Fabiano Schivardi (2019). "Do Female Executives Make a Difference? The Impact of Female Leadership on Gender Gaps and Firm Performance." The Economic Journal 129(622), August 2019, 2390–2423.

                          @article{flabbi-macis-moro-schivardi-EJ-2019,
                           title = "Do Female Executives Make a Difference? The Impact of Female Leadership on Gender Gaps and Firm Performance",
                           author = "Luca Flabbi and Mario Macis and Andrea Moro and Fabiano Schivardi",
                           journal = {The Economic Journal},
                           volume = 129,
                           issue = 622,
                           pages = {2390–2423},
                           year = {2019},
                           month = {August},
                           doi = {10.1093/ej/uez012},
                           URL = "https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uez012"
                          }
                        

• Endogenous Comparative Advantage
  • Scandinavian Journal of Economics Vol. 121(3), 2019, 1088-1124 (First published online 22 February 2018), (with Peter Norman)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    We develop a model of trade between identical countries. Workers endogenously acquire skills that are imperfectly observed by firms, who therefore use aggregate country investment as the prior when evaluating workers. This creates an informational externality interacting with general equilibrium effects on each country's skill premium. Asymmetric equilibria with comparative advantages exist even when there is a unique equilibrium under autarky. Symmetric, no-trade equilibria may be unstable under free trade. Welfare effects are ambiguous: trade may be Pareto improving even if it leads to an equilibrium with rich and poor countries, with no special advantage to country size.
  • External appendix
  • Citation BibTeX
    Moro, Andrea and Peter Norman (2019). "Endogenous Comparative Advantage", Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol 121 (3), July 2019, 1088-1124.

                          @article {moro-norman-sje-2019,
                          author = {Moro, Andrea and Norman, Peter},
                          title = {Endogenous Comparative Advantage},
                          journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
                          issn = {1467-9442},
                          volume = {121},
                          issue = {3},
                          year = {2019},
                          month = {July}
                          url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12291},
                          doi = {10.1111/sjoe.12291},
                          pages = {1088-1124},
                          keywords = {Trade, specialization, human capital, reputation},
                          }
                        

• The Impact of Obesity on Wages: the Role of Personal Interactions and Job Selection
  • Labour Vol. 33(2), June 2019, 125-146 (with Tommaso Tempesti and D. Sebastian Tello-Trillo)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    We estimate the effects of obesity on wages accounting for the endogenous selection of workers into jobs requiring different levels of personal interactions in the workplace. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 combined with detailed information about occupation characteristics from O*Net, we confirm the results from the literature finding a wage penalty for obese white women. This penalty is higher in jobs that require a high level of personal interactions. Accounting for job selection does not significantly change the estimated wage penalty.
  • External appendix
  • Citation BibTeX
    Moro, Andrea, D. Sebastian Tello-Trillo, and Tommaso Tempesti (2019). "The Impact of Obesity on Wages: the Role of Personal Interactions and Job Selection", Labour Vol 33(2), June 2019, 125-146.

                          @article{moro-tello-tempesti-2019,
                           title = "The Impact of Obesity on Wages: the Role of Personal Interactions and Job Selection",
                           author = "Andrea Moro and D. Sebastian Tello-Trillo, and Tommaso Tempesti",
                           journal = {Labour},
                           issn = {},
                           doi = {},
                           volume = {33},
                           issue = {2},
                           pages = {125--146},
                           year = "2019",
                           month = {June}
                           URL = "https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/labr.12145"
                           }
                        

• The Effect of Job Flexibility on Women Labor Market Outcomes: Estimates from a Search and Bargaining Model
  • Journal of Econometrics Vol. 168, 2012, 81-95 (with Luca Flabbi)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    This paper presents and estimates a search model of the labor market where jobs are characterized by wages and work-hours exibility. Flexibility is valued by workers, and is costly to provide for employers. The model generates observed wage distributions directly related to the preference for exibility parameters: the higher the preference for exibility, the wider is the support of the wage distribution at exible jobs and the larger is the discontinuity between the wage distribution at exible and non- exible jobs. Results show that more than one third of women place positive value to exibility, and that reducing the cost of exibility may considerably reduce the gender wage gap.
  • Citation BibTeX
    Moro, Andrea and Luca Flabbi(2012)). "The Effect of Job Flexibility on Women Labor Market Outcomes: Estimates from a Search and Bargaining Model", Journal of Econometrics 168, 2012, 81-95

                          @article{moro-flabbi-joe-2012,
                              title={The effect of job flexibility on female labor market outcomes:
                                Estimates from a search and bargaining model},
                              author={Flabbi, Luca and Moro, Andrea},
                              journal={Journal of Econometrics},
                              volume={168},
                              number={1},
                              pages={81--95},
                              year={2012},
                              publisher={Elsevier}
                          }
                        

• Theories of Statistical Discrimination and Affirmative Action: A Survey
  • Handbook of Social Economics, Vol. 1A, Chapter 5, (with Hanming Fang), 2011
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    This chapter surveys the theoretical literature on statistical discrimination and affirmative action. This literature suggests different explanations for the existence and persistence of group inequality. This survey highlights such differences and describes in these contexts the effffects of color-sighted and color-blind affrmative action policies, and the efficiency implications of discriminatory outcomes
  • Citation BibTeX
    Fang, Hanming and Andrea Moro (2011). "Chapter 5 - Theories of Statistical Discrimination and Affirmative Action: A Survey." In Benhabib, Jess, Matthew Jackson and Alberto Bisin, editors: Handbook of Social Economics, Vol. 1A, Chapter 5, The Netherlands: North Holland, pp. 133-200

                          @incollection{fang-moro-handbook-2011,
                            title = "Chapter 5 - Theories of Statistical Discrimination and Affirmative
                              Action: A Survey"
                            editor = "Jess Benhabib and Alberto Bisin and Matthew O. Jackson",
                            series = "Handbook of Social Economics",
                            publisher = "North-Holland",
                            volume = "1",
                            number = "Supplement C",
                            pages = "133 - 200",
                            year = "2011",
                            issn = "1570-6435",
                            doi = "https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-53187-2.00005-X",
                            url = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B978044453187200005X",
                            author = "Hanming Fang and Andrea Moro",
                            keywords = "Affirmative Action, Discrimination"
                          }
                        

• What Do We Know about Discrimination in Latin America? Very Little!
  • in Hugo Nopo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro (eds.), Discrimination in Latin America. An Economic Perspective, Chapter 1 (with Hugo Nopo and Alberto Chong), 2010
  • More info...
  • Citation BibTeX
    Nopo, Hugo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro (2010). "What Do We Know about Discrimination in Latin America? Very Little!." in Hugo Nopo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro (eds.), Discrimination in Latin America. An Economic Perspective, Inter-American Development Bank and The World Bank Publications, Washington D.C., 2010, Chapter 1, 1-11

                          @incollection{nopo-chong-moro-2010,
                            title = "What Do We Know about Discrimination in Latin America? Very Little!."
                            editor = "Hugo Nopo and Alberto Chong and Andrea Moro",
                            series = "Discrimination in Latin America.
                              An Economic Perspective",
                            publisher = "Inter-American Development Bank and The World Bank Publications",
                            pages = "1-11",
                            year = "2010",
                            url = "https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2694",
                            author = "Hugo Nopo and Alberto Chong and Andrea Moro",
                            keywords = "Discrimination, Latin America"
                          }
                        

• Statistical Discrimination,
  • The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics online. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    Statistical discrimination is a theory of inequality between demographic groups based on stereotypes that do not arise from prejudice or racial and gender bias.When rational, information-seeking decision makers use aggregate group characteristics, such as group averages, to evaluate individual personal characteristics, individuals belonging to different groups may be treated differently even if they share identical observable characteristics in every other aspect. Discrimination can be the agents’ efficient response to asymmetric beliefs, or discriminatory outcomes may display an element of inefficiency: the disadvantaged group could perform better if beliefs were not asymmetric across groups (but beliefs are asymmetric because the disadvantaged are not performing as well as the dominant group)
• The Performance of the Pivotal-Voter Model in Small-scale elections: Evidence from Texas Liquor Referenda
  • Journal of Public Economics Vol. 92(4), April 2008, 582-96 (with Stephen Coate and Michael Conlin)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    This paper explores the ability of pivotal-voter models to explain voter behavior in small-scale elections using data from Texas liquor referenda. The findings provide little support for the view that pivotal-voter models are a reasonable theory for understanding small-scale elections. Interestingly, this is not because they cannot explain the levels of turnout in the data, but rather because they cannot explain the size of the winning margins. The logic of pivotal-voter models implies that elections must be expected to be close even if there is a significant difference between the sizes of the groups or the intensity of their preferences. With even a relatively small number of eligible voters, elections that are expected to be close ex ante must end up being close ex post. However, in the data, winning margins are often significant.
  • Citation BibTeX
    Coate, Stephen, Michael Conlin, and Andrea Moro (2008). "The Performance of the Pivotal-Vote Model in Small-scale elections: Evidence from Texas Liquor Referenda" Journal of Public Economics 92(4), April 2008, 582-96

                          @article{coate-conlin-moro-jpube-2008,
                            title = {The performance of pivotal-voter models in small-scale elections:
                              Evidence from Texas liquor referenda},
                            author = {Coate, Stephen and Conlin, Michael and Moro, Andrea},
                            year = {2008},
                            journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
                            volume = {92},
                            number = {3-4},
                            pages = {582-596},
                            url = {https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:3-4:p:582-596}
                          }
                        

• Electoral Design and Voter Welfare from the U.S. Senate: Evidence from a Dynamic Selection Model
  • Review of Economic Dynamics Vol. 11(1), January 2008, 1-17 (with by Gautam Gowrisankaran and Matt Mitchell)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    Since 1914, the U.S. Senate has been elected and incumbent senators allowed to run for reelection without limit. This differs from several other elected offices in the U.S., which impose term limits on incumbents. Term limits may harm the electorate if tenure is beneficial or if they force high quality candidates to retire but may also benefit the electorate if they cause higher quality candidates to run. We investigate how changes in electoral design affect voter utility by specifying and structurally estimating a dynamic model of voter decisions. We find that tenure effects for the U.S. Senate are negative or small and that incumbents face weaker challengers than candidates running for open seats. Because of this, term limits can significantly increase voter welfare.
  • Citation BibTeX
    Gowrisankaran, Gautam, Matthew Mitchell, and Andrea Moro (2008). "Electoral Design and Voter Welfare from the U.S. Senate: Evidence from a Dynamic Selection Model." Review of Economic Dynamics 11(1), January 2008, 1-17

                          @article{gowrisankaran-mitchell-moro-red-2008,
                            title = {Electoral Design and Voter Welfare from the U.S. Senate:
                              Evidence from a Dynamic Selection Model},
                            author = {Gowrisankaran, Gautam and Mitchell, Matthew and Moro, Andrea},
                            year = {2008},
                            journal = {Review of Economic Dynamics},
                            volume = {11},
                            number = {1},
                            pages = {1-17},
                            keywords = {Term limits; Incumbency advantage; Elections; Selection; Tenure; Senate},
                            url = {https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:issued:06-91}
                          }
                        

• Persistent Distortionary Policies with Asymmetric Information ,
  • American Economic Review Vol. 96(1), March 2006, 387-93 (with Matt Mitchell)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    Why are distortionary policies used when seemingly Pareto improvements exist? According to a standard textbook argument, a Pareto improvement can be obtained by eliminating the distortions, compensating the losers with a lump sum transfer and redistributing the gains that are left over. We relax the assumption that winners know the losses suffered by the losers and show that the informationally efficient method of compensating losers may involve the use of seemingly inefficient (but informationally efficient) distortionary policies. The risk of over-compensating losers may make distortions informationally efficient.
  • Citation BibTeX
    Mitchell, Matthew and Andrea Moro (2006). "Persistent Distortionary Policies with Asymmetric Information", American Economic Review Vol 96(1), March 2006, 387-93

                          @article{mitchell-moro-aer-2006,
                            title = {Persistent Distortionary Policies with Asymmetric Information},
                            author = {Mitchell, Matthew and Moro, Andrea},
                            year = {2006},
                            journal = {American Economic Review},
                            volume = {96},
                            number = {1},
                            pages = {387-393},
                            url = {https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:1:p:387-393}
                          }
                        

• A General Equilibrium Model of Statistical Discrimination,
  • Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 114 (1), January 2004, 1-30 (with Peter Norman)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    We study a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation in which ex ante identical groups may be treated asymmetrically in equilibrium. The interaction between an informational externality and general equilibrium effects creates incentives for groups to specialize, and discrimination may arise even if the corresponding model with a single group has a unique equilibrium. The dominant group gains from discrimination, rationalizing why a majority may be reluctant to eliminate discrimination. The model is also consistent with "reverse discrimination'' as a remedy against discrimination since it may be necessary to decrease the welfare of the dominant group to achieve parity.
  • External appendix
  • Citation BibTeX
    Moro, Andrea and Peter Norman (2004). "A General Equilibrium Model of Statistical Discrimination", Journal of Economic Theory 114 (1), January 2004, 1-30

                        	@article{moro-norman-jet-2004,
                            title = "A general equilibrium model of statistical
                             discrimination",
                            journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
                            volume = "114",
                            number = "1",
                            pages = "1 - 30",
                            year = "2004",
                            issn = "0022-0531",
                            doi = "https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00165-0",
                            url = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053103001650",
                            author = "Andrea Moro and Peter Norman",
                            keywords = "Statistical discrimination, Inequality, Specialization, Human capital"
                        	}
    										

• Empirical Implications of Statistical Discrimination on the Returns to Measures of Skill
  • Annales d'Économie et de Statistique Vol. 71-72, July-December 2003, 399-417 (with Peter Norman)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    This paper investigates how lack of information may bias the investigator's assessment of the presence of statistical discrimination. We show that the nature of the bias is such that statistical discrimination may be rejected in a Mincerian regression even when the data is generated from an equilibrium with statistical discrimination. This may occur even when the investigator has a more informative signal of productivity the employers have.
  • Citation BibTeX
    Moro, Andrea and Peter Norman (2003). "Empirical Implications of Statistical Discrimination on the Returns to Measures of Skill." Annales d'Économie et de Statistique 71-72, July-December 2003, 399-417

                           @article{moro-norman-ann-2003,
                              author={Andrea Moro and Peter Norman},
                              title={Empirical Implications of Statistical Discrimination on the Returns to Measures of Skill},
                              journal={Annals of Economics and Statistics},
                              year=2003,
                              volume={},
                              number={71-72},
                              pages={377-398},
                              month={},
                              keywords={},
                              doi={},
                              url={https://annals.ensae.fr/wp-content/uploads/pdf/n7172/vol7172-19.pdf
                          }
                        

• The Effect of Statistical Discrimination on Black-White Wage Inequality: Estimating a Model with Multiple Equilibria
  • International Economic Review Vol. 44(2), May 2003, 467-500
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    This paper presents the structural estimation of a statistical discrimination model. Although the model is capable of displaying multiple equilibria, an estimation strategy that identifies both the parameters of the model and the equilibrium chosen by the economic agents is developed and empirically implemented. A comparison between the equilibria that were selected in the economy over time and the other potential equilibria reveals that the decline in wage inequality experienced in the U.S. economy in the last thirty years cannot be attributed to changes in the equilibrium selection.
  • Omitted computations
  • Citation BibTeX
    Moro, Andrea (2003). "The Effect of Statistical Discrimination on Black-White Wage Inequality: Estimating a Model with Multiple Equilibria" International Economic Review 44 (2), May 2003, 467-500

                          @article{moro-ier-2003,
                            title={The effect of statistical discrimination on black--white wage inequality: estimating a model with multiple equilibria},
                            author={Moro, Andrea},
                            journal={International Economic Review},
                            volume={44},
                            number={2},
                            pages={467--500},
                            year={2003},
                            publisher={Wiley Online Library}
                          }
                        

• Affirmative Action in a Competitive Economy
  • Journal of Public Economics Vol. 87(3-4), March 2003, 567-594 (with Peter Norman)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    We consider a model of endogenous human capital formation with competitively determined wages. In the presence of two distinguishable, but ex ante identical groups of workers, we show that discrimination is sustainable in equilibrium, even if the corresponding model with a single group of workers has a unique equilibrium. An affirmative action policy consisting of a quota may ``fail'' in the sense that there still may be equilibria where groups are treated differently. However, the incentives to invest for agents in the discriminated group are improved by affirmative action if the initial equilibrium is the most discriminatory equilibrium in the model without the policy. The welfare effects are ambiguous. We demonstrate that it is possible that the policy makes the intended beneficiaries worse off: even if the starting point is the most discriminatory equilibrium the expected payoff may decrease for all agents in the target group
  • Citation BibTeX
    Moro, Andrea and Peter Norman (2003). "Affirmative Action in a Competitive Economy" Journal of Public Economics 87 (3-4), March 2003, 567-594

                          @article{moro-norman-jpube-2003,
                            title={Affirmative action in a competitive economy},
                            author={Moro, Andrea and Norman, Peter},
                            journal={Journal of Public Economics},
                            volume={87},
                            number={3},
                            pages={567--594},
                            year={2003},
                            publisher={Elsevier}
                          }
                        

• Dynamics of Demographic Development and its Impact on Personal Savings: Case of Japan
  • Research in Economics Vol. 49, 1995, 179-205 (with by Albert Ando, Juan Pablo Cordoba, and Gonzalo Garland)
  • More info...
  • Citation BibTeX
    Ando, Albert, Juan Pablo Cordoba, Gonzalo Garland, and Andrea Moro (1995). "Dynamics of Demographic Development and its Impact on Personal Savings: Case of Japan" Research in Economics 49, 1995, 179-205

                          @article{ando1995dynamics,
                            title={Dynamics of demographic development and its impact on personal saving: case of Japan},
                            author={Ando, Albert and Moro, Andrea and Cordoba, Juan Pablo and Garland, Gonzalo},
                            journal={Ricerche Economiche},
                            volume={49},
                            number={3},
                            pages={179--205},
                            year={1995},
                            publisher={Elsevier}
                          }
                        

Contact me

Andrea Moro
Department of Economics, Vanderbilt university
VU Station B #351819
Nashville, TN 37212

Office phone : +1 615 343 1516
Econ dept fax : +1 615 343 8495

Email: andrea at andreamoro dot net

Follow this link if you are looking for Andrea Moro, the italian linguist