Andrea Moro's webpage

 Curriculum Vitae

Published papers

• Exclusion of Extreme Jurors and Minority Representation: The Effect of Jury Selection Procedures
  • The Journal of Law and Economics 67, May 2024 (with Martin Van der Linden)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    We compare two jury selection procedures meant to safeguard against the inclusion of biased jurors that are perceived as causing minorities to be under-represented. The Strike and Replace procedure presents potential jurors one-by-one to the parties, while the Struck procedure presents all potential jurors before the parties exercise vetoes. Struck more effectively excludes extreme jurors but leads to a worse representation of minorities. The advantage of Struck in terms of excluding extremes is sizable in a wide range of cases. In contrast, Strike and Replace better represents minorities only if the minority and majority are heavily polarized. Results are robust to assuming the parties statistically discriminate against jurors based on group identity.
  • External appendix
  • Replication package
  • CitationBibTeX
    Moro, Andrea, and Martin Van der Linden. "Exclusion of Extreme Jurors and Minority Representation: The Effect of Jury Selection Procedures," The Journal of Law and Economics 67, pp. 295-336, May 2024

    @article{moro-vanderlinden-juryselection-2024,
        title = "Exclusion of Extreme Jurors and Minority Representation: The Effect of Jury Selection Procedures",
        author = "Moro, Andrea and Martin {Van der Linden}",
        year = "2024",
        month = " May",
        journal = "The Journal of Law and Economics",
        volume = "67",
        pages = "295-336",
        url = "http://andreamoro.net/assets/papers/juryselection.pdf"
    }

• Spatial-SIR with Network Structure and Behavior: Lockdown Policies and the Lucas Critique
  • Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 198, June 2022 (with Alberto Bisin)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    We introduce a model of the diffusion of an epidemic with demographically heterogeneous agents interacting socially on a spatially structured network. Contagion-risk averse agents respond behaviorally to the diffusion of the infections by limiting their social interactions. Schools and workplaces also respond by allowing students and employees to attend and work remotely. The spatial structure induces local herd immunities along socio-demographic dimensions, which significantly affect the dynamics of infections. We study several non-pharmaceutical interventions; e.g., i) lockdown rules, which set thresholds on the spread of the infection for the closing and reopening of economic activities; ii) neighborhood lockdowns, leveraging granular (neighborhood-level) information to improve the effectiveness public health policies; iii) selective lockdowns, which restrict social interactions by location (in the network) and by the demographic characteristics of the agents. Substantiating a "Lucas critique" argument, we assess the cost of naive discretionary policies ignoring agents and firms’ behavioral responses.
  • CitationBibTeX
    Bisin, Alberto, and Andrea Moro. "Spatial-SIR with Network Structure and Behavior: Lockdown Policies and the Lucas Critique," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 198, pp. 370-388, June 2022

    @article{bisin-moro-lockdown-lucas-critique-2022,
        title = "Spatial-SIR with Network Structure and Behavior: Lockdown Policies and the Lucas Critique",
        author = "Bisin, Alberto and Andrea Moro",
        year = "2022",
        month = " June",
        journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization",
        volume = "198",
        pages = "370-388",
        url = "http://andreamoro.net/assets/papers/LockdownLC.pdf"
    }

• JUE Insight: Learning Epidemiology by Doing: The Empirical Implications of a Spatial SIR Model with Behavioral Responses
  • Journal of Urban Economics 127, January 2022 (with Alberto Bisin)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    We simulate a spatial behavioral model of the diffusion of an infection to understand the role of geographical characteristics: city size, density, distribution of initial outbreaks, movement of agents. We show that several invariance properties of the SIR model with respect to these variables do not hold when agents are placed in a two dimensional space. Local herd immunity plays a fundamental role in changing the dynamics of the infection. We also show that geographical factors affect how behavioral responses affect the epidemics. We derive relevant implications for the estimation of epidemiological models with panel data from several geographical units.
  • External appendix
  • Replication package
  • Twitter thread
  • CitationBibTeX
    Bisin, Alberto, and Andrea Moro. "JUE Insight: Learning Epidemiology by Doing: The Empirical Implications of a Spatial SIR Model with Behavioral Responses," Journal of Urban Economics 127, January 2022

    @article{bisin-moro-spatialsir-2022,
        title = "JUE Insight: Learning Epidemiology by Doing: The Empirical Implications of a Spatial SIR Model with Behavioral Responses",
        author = "Bisin, Alberto and Andrea Moro",
        year = "2022",
        month = " January ",
        journal = "Journal of Urban Economics",
        volume = "127",
        url = "http://andreamoro.net/assets/papers/spatialSIR.pdf"
    }

• Testing for asymmetric employer learning and statistical discrimination
  • Applied Economics 53(12), June 2021 (with Suqin Ge and Beibei Zhu)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    We test if firms statistically discriminate workers based on race when employer learning is asymmetric. Using data from the NLSY79, we find evidence of asymmetric employer learning. In addition, employers statistically discriminate against non-college educated black workers at time of hiring. We also find that employers directly observe most of the productivity of college graduates at hiring and learn very little over time about these workers.
  • CitationBibTeX
    Suqin Ge, Andrea Moro, and Beibei Zhu. "Testing for asymmetric employer learning and statistical discrimination," Applied Economics 53(12), pp. 1361-1377, June 2021

    @article{ge-moro-zhu-asymmetric-learning-2021,
        title = "Testing for asymmetric employer learning and statistical discrimination",
        author = "Suqin Ge and Andrea Moro and Beibei Zhu",
        year = "2021",
        month = " June ",
        journal = "Applied Economics",
        number = "12",
        volume = "53",
        pages = "1361-1377",
        url = "http://andreamoro.net/assets/papers/asymmetric-learning.pdf"
    }

• LATE for History
  • Handbook of Historical Economics Vol. 1, The Netherlands: North-Holland, 2021 (with Alberto Bisin)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    In Historical Economics, Persistence studies document the persistence of some historical phenomenon or leverage this persistence to identify causal relationships of interest in the present. In this chapter, we analyze the implications of allowing for heterogeneous treatment effects in these studies.We delineate their common empirical structure, argue that heterogeneous treatment effects are likely in their context, and propose minimal abstract models that help interpret results and guide the development of empirical strategies to uncover the mechanisms generating the effects.
  • CitationBibTeX
    Bisin, Alberto, and Andrea Moro. "LATE for History," in Bisin, Alberto, and Giovanni Federico, editors: Handbook of Historical Economics, Vol. 1, Ch. 10, The Netherlands: North-Holland, 2021

    @incollection{bisin-moro-late-for-history-2021,
        title = "LATE for History",
        author = "Bisin, Alberto and Andrea Moro",
        year = "2021",
        editor = " Bisin, Alberto and Giovanni Federico",
        booktitle = " Handbook of Historical Economics",
        publisher = "The Netherlands: North-Holland",
        chapter = "10",
        volume = "1",
        url = "http://andreamoro.net/assets/papers/LATE_for_History.pdf"
    }

• Do Female Executives Make a Difference? The Impact of Female Leadership on Gender Gaps and Firm Performance
  • The Economic Journal 129, August 2019 (with Luca Flabbi, Mario Macis and Fabiano Schivardi)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    We investigate the effects of female executives on gender-specific wage distributions and firm performance. We find that female leadership has a positive impact at the top of the female wage distribution and a negative impact at the bottom. Moreover, the impact of female leadership on firm performance increases with the share of female workers. Our empirical strategy accounts for the endogeneity induced by the non-random assignment of executives to firms by including in the regressions firm fixed effects, by generating controls from a two-way fixed effects regression, and by building instruments based on regional trends. The empirical findings are consistent with a model of statistical dis- crimination where female executives are better equipped at interpreting signals of productivity from female workers. The evidence suggests substantial costs of under-representation of women at the top of the corporate hierarchy.
  • External appendix
  • CitationBibTeX
    Flabbi, Luca, Mario Macis, Andrea Moro, and Fabiano Schivardi. "Do Female Executives Make a Difference? The Impact of Female Leadership on Gender Gaps and Firm Performance," The Economic Journal 129, pp. 2390–2423, August 2019

    @article{flabbi-macis-moro-schivardi-effects-female-ceos-2019,
        title = "Do Female Executives Make a Difference? The Impact of Female Leadership on Gender Gaps and Firm Performance",
        author = "Flabbi, Luca and Mario Macis and Andrea Moro and Fabiano Schivardi",
        year = "2019",
        month = " August",
        journal = "The Economic Journal",
        volume = "129",
        pages = "2390–2423",
        url = "https://andreamoro.net/assets/papers/femaleceo.pdf"
    }

• Endogenous Comparative Advantage
  • The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 121, July 2019 (with Peter Norman)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    We develop a model of trade between identical countries. Workers endogenously acquire skills that are imperfectly observed by firms, who therefore use aggregate country investment as the prior when evaluating workers. This creates an informational externality interacting with general equilibrium effects on each country's skill premium. Asymmetric equilibria with comparative advantages exist even when there is a unique equilibrium under autarky. Symmetric, no-trade equilibria may be unstable under free trade. Welfare effects are ambiguous: trade may be Pareto improving even if it leads to an equilibrium with rich and poor countries, with no special advantage to country size.
  • External appendix
  • CitationBibTeX
    Moro, Andrea, and Peter Norman. "Endogenous Comparative Advantage," The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 121, pp. 1088-1124, July 2019

    @article{moro-norman-endogenous-comparative-advantage-2019,
        title = "Endogenous Comparative Advantage",
        author = "Moro, Andrea and Peter Norman",
        year = "2019",
        month = " July",
        journal = "The Scandinavian Journal of Economics",
        volume = "121",
        pages = "1088-1124",
        url = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12291"
    }

• The Impact of Obesity on Wages: the Role of Personal Interactions and Job Selection
  • Labour 33, June 2019 (with Daniel Sebastian Tello-Trillo and Tommaso Tempesti)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    We estimate the effects of obesity on wages accounting for the endogenous selection of workers into jobs requiring different levels of personal interactions in the workplace. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 combined with detailed information about occupation characteristics from O*Net, we confirm the results from the literature finding a wage penalty for obese white women. This penalty is higher in jobs that require a high level of personal interactions. Accounting for job selection does not significantly change the estimated wage penalty.
  • External appendix
  • CitationBibTeX
    Moro, Andrea, D. Sebastian Tello-Trillo, and Tommaso Tempesti. "The Impact of Obesity on Wages: the Role of Personal Interactions and Job Selection," Labour 33, pp. 125--146, June 2019

    @article{moro-tellotrillo-tempesti-obesity-wages-2019,
        title = "The Impact of Obesity on Wages: the Role of Personal Interactions and Job Selection",
        author = "Moro, Andrea and {D. Sebastian} Tello-Trillo and Tommaso Tempesti",
        year = "2019",
        month = " June",
        journal = "Labour",
        volume = "33",
        pages = "125--146",
        url = "https://andreamoro.net/assets/papers/obesity.pdf"
    }

• The effect of job flexibility on female labor market outcomes: Estimates from a search and bargaining model
  • Journal of Econometrics 168(1), January 2012 (with Luca Flabbi)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    This paper presents and estimates a search model of the labor market where jobs are characterized by wages and work-hours exibility. Flexibility is valued by workers, and is costly to provide for employers. The model generates observed wage distributions directly related to the preference for exibility parameters: the higher the preference for exibility, the wider is the support of the wage distribution at exible jobs and the larger is the discontinuity between the wage distribution at exible and non- exible jobs. Results show that more than one third of women place positive value to exibility, and that reducing the cost of exibility may considerably reduce the gender wage gap.
  • CitationBibTeX
    Flabbi, Luca, and Andrea Moro. "The effect of job flexibility on female labor market outcomes: Estimates from a search and bargaining model," Journal of Econometrics 168(1), pp. 81--95, January 2012

    @article{flabbi-moro-job-flexibility-2012,
        title = "The effect of job flexibility on female labor market outcomes: Estimates from a search and bargaining model",
        author = "Flabbi, Luca and Andrea Moro",
        year = "2012",
        month = " January ",
        journal = "Journal of Econometrics",
        number = "1",
        volume = "168",
        pages = "81--95",
        url = "http://www.andreamoro.net/assets/papers/the_effect_of_job_flexibility.pdf"
    }

• Theories of Statistical Discrimination and Affirmative Action: A Survey
  • Handbook of Social Economics Vol. 1, North-Holland, 2011 (with Hanming Fang)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    This chapter surveys the theoretical literature on statistical discrimination and affirmative action. This literature suggests different explanations for the existence and persistence of group inequality. This survey highlights such differences and describes in these contexts the effects of color-sighted and color-blind affrmative action policies, and the efficiency implications of discriminatory outcomes
  • CitationBibTeX
    Hanming Fang, and Andrea Moro. "Theories of Statistical Discrimination and Affirmative Action: A Survey," in Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, and Matthew O. Jackson, editors: Handbook of Social Economics, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, North-Holland, 2011

    @incollection{fang-moro-theories-statistical-discrimination-2011,
        title = "Theories of Statistical Discrimination and Affirmative Action: A Survey",
        author = "Hanming Fang and Andrea Moro",
        year = "2011",
        editor = " Jess Benhabib and Alberto Bisin and Matthew O. Jackson",
        booktitle = " Handbook of Social Economics",
        publisher = "North-Holland",
        chapter = "5",
        volume = "1",
        pages = "133-200",
        url = "http://andreamoro.net/assets/papers/survey-statdisc.pdf"
    }

• What Do We Know about Discrimination in Latin America? Very Little!
  • Discrimination in Latin America. An Economic Perspective, Inter-American Development Bank and The World Bank Publications, 2010 (with Hugo Nopo and Alberto Chong)
  • More info...
  • CitationBibTeX
    Hugo Nopo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro. "What Do We Know about Discrimination in Latin America? Very Little!," in Hugo Nopo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro, editors: Discrimination in Latin America. An Economic Perspective,Inter-American Development Bank and The World Bank Publications, 2010

    @incollection{chong-nopo-moro-discrimination-latin-america-2010,
        title = "What Do We Know about Discrimination in Latin America? Very Little!",
        author = "Hugo Nopo and Alberto Chong and Andrea Moro",
        year = "2010",
        editor = " Hugo Nopo and Alberto Chong and Andrea Moro",
        booktitle = " Discrimination in Latin America. An Economic Perspective",
        publisher = "Inter-American Development Bank and The World Bank Publications",
        chapter = "",
        pages = "1-11",
        url = "https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2694"
    }

• Statistical Discrimination
  • The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    Statistical discrimination is a theory of inequality between demographic groups based on stereotypes that do not arise from prejudice or racial and gender bias. When rational, information-seeking decision makers use aggregate group characteristics, such as group averages, to evaluate individual personal characteristics, individuals belonging to different groups may be treated differently even if they share identical observable characteristics in every other aspect. Discrimination can be the agents' efficient response to asymmetric beliefs, or discriminatory outcomes may display an element of inefficiency: the disadvantaged group could perform better if beliefs were not asymmetric across groups (but beliefs are asymmetric because the disadvantaged are not performing as well as the dominant group)."
  • CitationBibTeX
    Moro, Andrea. "Statistical Discrimination," in Durlauf, Steven N., and Lawrence E. Blume, editors: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009

    @incollection{moro-statistical-discrimination-palgrave-dictionary-entry-2009,
        title = "Statistical Discrimination",
        author = "Moro, Andrea",
        year = "2009",
        editor = " Durlauf, Steven N. and Lawrence E. Blume",
        booktitle = " The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics",
        publisher = "Palgrave Macmillan UK",
        chapter = "",
        pages = "1-5",
        url = "https://andreamoro.net/assets/papers/palgrave-statistical-discrimination.pdf"
    }

• The performance of pivotal-voter models in small-scale elections: Evidence from Texas liquor referenda
  • Journal of Public Economics 92(3-4), April 2008 (with Stephen Coate and Michael Conlin)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    This paper explores the ability of pivotal-voter models to explain voter behavior in small-scale elections using data from Texas liquor referenda. The findings provide little support for the view that pivotal-voter models are a reasonable theory for understanding small-scale elections. Interestingly, this is not because they cannot explain the levels of turnout in the data, but rather because they cannot explain the size of the winning margins. The logic of pivotal-voter models implies that elections must be expected to be close even if there is a significant difference between the sizes of the groups or the intensity of their preferences. With even a relatively small number of eligible voters, elections that are expected to be close ex ante must end up being close ex post. However, in the data, winning margins are often significant.
  • CitationBibTeX
    Coate, Stephen, Conlin, Michael, and Andrea Moro. "The performance of pivotal-voter models in small-scale elections: Evidence from Texas liquor referenda," Journal of Public Economics 92(3-4), pp. 582-596, April 2008

    @article{coate-conlin-moro-performance-pivotal-voter-model-texas-2008,
        title = "The performance of pivotal-voter models in small-scale elections: Evidence from Texas liquor referenda",
        author = "Coate, Stephen and Conlin, Michael and Andrea Moro",
        year = "2008",
        month = " April",
        journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
        number = "3-4",
        volume = "92",
        pages = "582-596",
        url = "http://www.andreamoro.net/assets/papers/the_performance_of_the_pivotal-voter_model.pdf"
    }

• Electoral Design and Voter Welfare from the U.S. Senate: Evidence from a Dynamic Selection Model
  • Review of Economic Dynamics 11(1), January 2008 (with Gautam Gowrisankaran and Matthew Mitchell)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    Since 1914, the U.S. Senate has been elected and incumbent senators allowed to run for reelection without limit. This differs from several other elected offices in the U.S., which impose term limits on incumbents. Term limits may harm the electorate if tenure is beneficial or if they force high quality candidates to retire but may also benefit the electorate if they cause higher quality candidates to run. We investigate how changes in electoral design affect voter utility by specifying and structurally estimating a dynamic model of voter decisions. We find that tenure effects for the U.S. Senate are negative or small and that incumbents face weaker challengers than candidates running for open seats. Because of this, term limits can significantly increase voter welfare.
  • CitationBibTeX
    Gowrisankaran, Gautam, Matthew Mitchell, and Andrea Moro. "Electoral Design and Voter Welfare from the U.S. Senate: Evidence from a Dynamic Selection Model," Review of Economic Dynamics 11(1), pp. 1-17, January 2008

    @article{gowrisankaran-mitchell-moro-electoral-design-welfare-us-senate-2008,
        title = "Electoral Design and Voter Welfare from the U.S. Senate: Evidence from a Dynamic Selection Model",
        author = "Gowrisankaran, Gautam and Matthew Mitchell and Andrea Moro",
        year = "2008",
        month = " January",
        journal = "Review of Economic Dynamics",
        number = "1",
        volume = "11",
        pages = "1-17",
        url = "http://www.andreamoro.net/assets/papers/electoral_design_and_voter_welfare.pdf"
    }

• Persistent Distortionary Policies with Asymmetric Information
  • American Economic Review 96(1), March 2006 (with Matthew Mitchell)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    Why are distortionary policies used when seemingly Pareto improvements exist? According to a standard textbook argument, a Pareto improvement can be obtained by eliminating the distortions, compensating the losers with a lump sum transfer and redistributing the gains that are left over. We relax the assumption that winners know the losses suffered by the losers and show that the informationally efficient method of compensating losers may involve the use of seemingly inefficient (but informationally efficient) distortionary policies. The risk of over-compensating losers may make distortions informationally efficient.
  • Nice twitter thread by Nageeb Ali
  • CitationBibTeX
    Mitchell, Matthew, and Andrea Moro. "Persistent Distortionary Policies with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review 96(1), pp. 387-393, March 2006

    @article{mitchell-moro-persistent-distortionary-policies-2006,
        title = "Persistent Distortionary Policies with Asymmetric Information",
        author = "Mitchell, Matthew and Andrea Moro",
        year = "2006",
        month = " March",
        journal = "American Economic Review",
        number = "1",
        volume = "96",
        pages = "387-393",
        url = "http://www.andreamoro.net/assets/papers/persistent_distortionary_policies.pdf"
    }

• A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination
  • Journal of Economic Theory 114(1), January 2004 (with Peter Norman)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    We study a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation in which ex ante identical groups may be treated asymmetrically in equilibrium. The interaction between an informational externality and general equilibrium effects creates incentives for groups to specialize, and discrimination may arise even if the corresponding model with a single group has a unique equilibrium. The dominant group gains from discrimination, rationalizing why a majority may be reluctant to eliminate discrimination. The model is also consistent with "reverse discrimination'' as a remedy against discrimination since it may be necessary to decrease the welfare of the dominant group to achieve parity.
  • CitationBibTeX
    Andrea Moro, and Peter Norman. "A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination," Journal of Economic Theory 114(1), pp. 1-30, January 2004

    @article{moro-norman-general-equilibrium-statistical-discrimination-2004,
        title = "A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination",
        author = "Andrea Moro and Peter Norman",
        year = "2004",
        month = " January",
        journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
        number = "1",
        volume = "114",
        pages = "1-30",
        url = "https://andreamoro.net/assets/papers/a_general_equilibrium_model_of_statistical_discrimination.pdf"
    }

• The effect of statistical discrimination on black-white wage inequality: estimating a model with multiple equilibria
  • International Economic Review 44(2), May 2003
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    This paper presents the structural estimation of a statistical discrimination model. Although the model is capable of displaying multiple equilibria, an estimation strategy that identifies both the parameters of the model and the equilibrium chosen by the economic agents is developed and empirically implemented. A comparison between the equilibria that were selected in the economy over time and the other potential equilibria reveals that the decline in wage inequality experienced in the U.S. economy in the last thirty years cannot be attributed to changes in the equilibrium selection.
  • CitationBibTeX
    Moro, Andrea. "The effect of statistical discrimination on black-white wage inequality: estimating a model with multiple equilibria," International Economic Review 44(2), pp. 467-500, May 2003

    @article{moro-effect-statistical-discrimination-estimation-2003,
        title = "The effect of statistical discrimination on black-white wage inequality: estimating a model with multiple equilibria",
        author = "Moro, Andrea",
        year = "2003",
        month = " May",
        journal = "International Economic Review",
        number = "2",
        volume = "44",
        pages = "467-500",
        url = "https://andreamoro.net/assets/papers/the_effect_of_statistical_discrimination_on_black-white_wage_inequality.pdf"
    }

• Affirmative action in a competitive economy
  • Journal of Public Economics 87(3), March 2003 (with Peter Norman)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    We consider a model of endogenous human capital formation with competitively determined wages. In the presence of two distinguishable, but ex ante identical groups of workers, we show that discrimination is sustainable in equilibrium, even if the corresponding model with a single group of workers has a unique equilibrium. An affirmative action policy consisting of a quota may ``fail'' in the sense that there still may be equilibria where groups are treated differently. However, the incentives to invest for agents in the discriminated group are improved by affirmative action if the initial equilibrium is the most discriminatory equilibrium in the model without the policy. The welfare effects are ambiguous. We demonstrate that it is possible that the policy makes the intended beneficiaries worse off: even if the starting point is the most discriminatory equilibrium the expected payoff may decrease for all agents in the target group
  • CitationBibTeX
    Moro, Andrea, and Peter Norman. "Affirmative action in a competitive economy," Journal of Public Economics 87(3), pp. 567-594, March 2003

    @article{moro-norman-affirmative-action-2003,
        title = "Affirmative action in a competitive economy",
        author = "Moro, Andrea and Peter Norman",
        year = "2003",
        month = " March",
        journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
        number = "3",
        volume = "87",
        pages = "567-594",
        url = "https://andreamoro.net/assets/papers/jpub2003.pdf"
    }

• Empirical Implications of Statistical Discrimination on the Returns to Measures of Skill
  • Annals of Economics and Statistics 71-72, 2003 (with Peter Norman)
  • More info...
  • Abstract
    This paper investigates how lack of information may bias the investigator's assessment of the presence of statistical discrimination. We show that the nature of the bias is such that statistical discrimination may be rejected in a Mincerian regression even when the data is generated from an equilibrium with statistical discrimination. This may occur even when the investigator has a more informative signal of productivity the employers have.
  • CitationBibTeX
    Moro, Andrea, and Peter Norman. "Empirical Implications of Statistical Discrimination on the Returns to Measures of Skill," Annals of Economics and Statistics 71-72, pp. 399-417, 2003

    @article{moro-norman-empirical-implications-statistical-discrimination-2003,
        title = "Empirical Implications of Statistical Discrimination on the Returns to Measures of Skill",
        author = "Moro, Andrea and Peter Norman",
        year = "2003",
        journal = "Annals of Economics and Statistics",
        volume = "71-72",
        pages = "399-417",
        url = "https://andreamoro.net/assets/papers/empirical_implications_of_statistical_discrimination.pdf"
    }

• Dynamics of demographic development and its impact on personal saving: case of Japan
  • Ricerche Economiche 49(3), September 1995 (with Albert Ando, Juan Pablo Cordoba, and Gonzalo Garland)
  • More info...
  • CitationBibTeX
    Ando, Albert, Andrea Moro, Juan Pablo Cordoba, and Gonzalo Garland. "Dynamics of demographic development and its impact on personal saving: case of Japan," Ricerche Economiche 49(3), pp. 179-205, September 1995

    @article{ando-et-al-savings-japan-1995,
        title = "Dynamics of demographic development and its impact on personal saving: case of Japan",
        author = "Ando, Albert and Andrea Moro and Juan Pablo Cordoba and Gonzalo Garland",
        year = "1995",
        month = " September",
        journal = "Ricerche Economiche",
        number = "3",
        volume = "49",
        pages = "179-205",
        url = "https://andreamoro.net/assets/papers/dynamic-of-demographics-RE-95.pdf"
    }

Contact me

Andrea Moro
Department of Economics, Vanderbilt university
VU Station B #351819
Nashville, TN 37235

Office phone : (please email first if you must call) +1 615 343 1516
Econ dept fax : +1 615 343 8495
GitHub

Email: andrea at andreamoro dot net

Follow this link if you are looking for Andrea Moro, the italian linguist